Dr. Brian P. R. Morton

Dr. Brian P. R. Morton

email: bmorton3@isugw.indstate.edu

My web page contains further detail on all aspects of my academic life, including sample syllabi, and papers for download, at http://isu1.indstate.edu/bmorton3/morton.htm

Office: Home:

Department of Philosophy 5469 Lagoon Ct, Apt Ar

Indiana State University Terre Haute, IN 47803

Root Hall A-138D USA

Terre Haute, IN 47807 812-237-6829

812-237-3098 bmorton3@isugw.indstate.edu
Summary

AOS: Philosophy of Religion, Logic

AOC: Non-Western Philosophy, Ancient Philosophy, Medieval Philosophy, Philosophy of Language, Comparative Mysticism

Education

Ph. D. in Philosophy, Indiana University, Bloomington, June 2003, Ph. D minor in Religious Studies.

B.A in Philosophy/Religion, Northeast Missouri State University (now called Truman State University), 1995, Thesis: “Time, Aeon and Eternity: Styles of the Divine in the Tripartite Tractate.” Graduated with honors in Philosophy/Religion.

B.A in Mathematics, Northeast Missouri State University, 1995 Summa Cum Laude.

Leten Seminar, University of Velikoturnovo, “St. Cyril and Methodius” Velikoturnovo, Bulgaria, 1991, a summer seminar in Bulgarian language and culture.

Research

Dissertation:

“Ineffability and Self-Refutation: Non-Monotonic Logic in the Thought of Pseudo-Dionysius, Sextus Empiricus, and the Astasahasrika Prajnaparamita” (see attached abstract). Dissertation Chair: Professor Timothy O'Connor. Dissertation Committee: Professors Paul Spade, Michael Dunn, and David Brakke. Defended in May 2003.

Presentations and Publications:

“Self Refutation and Non-Monotonic Reasoning” - Washington State University/ University of Idaho, Philosophy Colloquium Series, Oct 2003.
“Love in the Mystical Poetry of Medieval Islam,” presented to the U of I Faculty Colloquium Series Oct 2003, and published in Literae: A Newsletter for Literature and Translation. Issue 1, 1997.
“What Gender is the Richest Person in the World: Or Abusing the Notion of Personhood” - International Conference on Persons, Memphis TN, Aug 2003.
“Logical Atoms in Buddhist Ontology: Some Philosophical Ideas in the Astasahasrika Prajnaparamita” - IU Philosophy Colloquium series, Nov 2002.
“12 Metaphors for Embryonic Stem Cell Research” - Invited as a panelist for Association for Practical and Professional Ethics Conference, Cincinnati OH, Feb. 2002. Published in proceedings.
“Truth and Other Alethic Desiderata” - IU Philosophy Graduate Colloquium, Oct. 2000.
“Truth and Nonsense” - IU Philosophy Graduate Colloquium, Nov. 1999.
“Time, Aeon and Eternity: Styles of the Divine in the Tripartite Tractate.” - Mid-South Undergraduate Conference, Mar. 1995. Published in proceedings.
“Jesus Made Funny Faces: Denials of the Crucifixion in Gnosticism and Islam” - Northeast Missouri State Undergraduate Philosophy Conference, April, 1994. Published in proceedings.

Works in Progress:

“6 Complicating Factors in Reflective Equilibrium”

“Varieties of Untruth”

“Square Circles: Or What Do We Learn by Slaying Philosophical Cliches?”

“Logical Atoms in Buddhist Ontology: Some Philosophical Ideas in thd Astasahasrika Prajnaparamita”

“Self Refutation and Non-Monotonic Reasoning”

Languages: Latin - excellent reading ability; Russian - once good now rusty; Parsi, Bulgarian, and Japanese - some formal training.

Awards:

Teaching Fellowship, Indiana University, 1996-2003

Arts and Science Graduate Fellowship, Indiana University, 1995-96

Who's Who of American Undergraduates, 1995

Second person in history of NMSU to graduate “with General Honors,” for upper division work in four widely spread fields.

National Merit Scholarship, NMSU Full-Ride Scholarship, Bright Flight Scholarship, the Latin Prize, Deans List, 1991-1995

Other Professional Activity:

Refereed journal and conference submissions

Nelson Dissertation Year Fellowship Advisor, 1998-9

Membership in APA
Teaching

I have taught most of the introductory courses in Philosophy, and a smattering of upper-division courses in Philosophy and Religious Studies. I would love to teach Introduction to Comparative Religion, or an introductory race, gender, and identity class. I could teach a variety of other undergraduate courses: Ancient Philosophy, Medieval Philosophy, Metaphysics, Epistemology, Philosophy of Language, Philosophy of Math, Phenomenology and Existentialism, etc. I would be happy to create undergraduate courses on any of the figures or traditions I have studied at the graduate level (e.g. Kant, Hegel, Buddhism, Gnosticism, Medieval Logic, etc.). I can teach Philosophy of Religion at any level including graduate, and would be happy to prepare graduate courses in modern logic, including Logical Theory, Modal Logic, or Non-Classical Logic.

Teaching Experience: (Numeral in parentheses indicate the number of times I taught the course at that location and level.)

Courses taught as the instructor with full responsibility (i.e. I designed the course, chose the texts, made the syllabus, and taught alone, or, in one case, with an assistant under me):
Philosophy Department, Indiana State University, Terre Haute - Assistant Professor, 2005-6 (in progress or scheduled). Introduction to Logic x2, Eastern Philosophy, Introduction to Philosophy x2, Philosophy of Religion.

Philosophy Department, Auburn University, Auburn - Visiting Assistant Professor, 2004-5 Introduction to Ethics x6, Introduction to Logic x4, Philosophy of Creativity (independent study).

Philosophy Department, University of Idaho, Moscow - Visiting Assistant Professor, 2003,4 (in progress). Phenomenology, Buddhism, History of Modern Philosophy, Confucianism/Taoism, Critical Thinking, Symbolic Logic.

Philosophy Department, Indiana University, Bloomington - Senior Associate Instructor, 1998-2002. Thinking and Reasoning (5), Introduction to Philosophy (1), Introductinn to Ethics (2), Elementary Logic (1).

Courses as an assistant (i.e. leading discussion sections, grading, etc.):
Philosophy Department, Indiana University, Bloomington - Associate Instructor, 1996-8, fall 2001. Introduction to Ethics (2), Elementary Logic (1), The Meaning of Life (1).

Tutor (leading tutoring sessions under a professor) - NMSU 1993-5: Logic, 1991-3: Algebra, Trigonometry, and Calculus

Graduate Work

Selected Topics in the History of Ethics - taught by Paul Eisenberg

(Eudaemonia in Greek thought, Utilitarianism, and Rawls)

Studies in Buddhism - taught by Jan Nattier

(prajnaparamita literature in ancient India, especially the Asta and Maha)

Intensive Reading - taught by Paul Franks

(a Phenomenology class on Heidegger's Being and Time)

Gnostic Religion and Literature - taught by David Brakke

(from Sethians to Valentinians and the school of Thomas)

Studies in Buddhism - taught by Jan Nattier

(Buddhas of other worlds in early Buddhism, esp. Aksobhya and Amitabha)

Philosophy of Language - taught by Anil Gupta

(Frege to Putnam; theories of truth, meaning and reference)

Logical Theory II - taught by David C. McCarthy

(incompleteness, undecidability results, computability theory)

Logical Theory I - taught by Michael Dunn

(soundness and completeness of first-order and propositional logic)

Alchemy and Its Offspring - taught by William Newman

(A survey of the history of alchemy from Zosimos to Newton)

Seminar Topics in History of Philosophy - taught by Paul Spade

(a survey of medieval logic and semantic theory)

Nineteenth Century Philosophy - taught by Frederick Beiser

(Kant, Fichte, Hegel's Logic, Phenomenology of Spirit, World History, etc.)

Social and Political Philosophy - taught by Milton Fisk

(Political and Economic philosophy, Sen, Beitz, etc.)

Systems of Modal Logic - taught by Michael Dunn

(Kripke semantics, proof theory, quantified modal logic, etc)

Theory of Knowledge - taught by David Finkelstein

(Twentieth century epistemology, Sellars, Austin, Wittgenstein, etc.)

Seminar in Metaphysics and Epistemology - taught by Timothy O'Connor

(the contemporary debate over free-will, compatibilism, incompatibilism, etc.)

Islamic Mysticism - taught by Scott Alexander

(a historical Survey of Sufism from Mohammed to Ibn 'Arabi)

Topics in the History of Modern Philosophy - taught by Graciella DePierris

(Kant's First Critique)

Phenomenology and Existentialism - taught by Paul Spade

(Husserl and Sartre)

References

Timothy O'Connor - toconnor@indiana.edu

Department of Philosophy

Indiana University Bloomington

Sycamore Hall

Bloomington, IN 47401

Paul Vincent Spade - spade@indiana.edu

Department of Philosophy

Indiana University Bloomington

Sycamore Hall

Bloomington, IN 47401

Michael Dunn - dunn@indiana.edu

School of Informatics

Indiana University Bloomington

Informatics Building 205, 901 E. 10th Str.

Bloomington, IN 47401

Jan Nattier - nattier7@indiana.edu (In India this year)

Department of Religious Studies

Indiana University Bloomington

Sycamore Hall

Bloomington, IN 47401

Douglas Lind - dlind@uidaho.edu

Department of Philosophy
University of Idaho
Morrill 407
Moscow, ID 84843




Abstract

Ineffability and Self-Refutation: Non-Monotonic Logic in the Thought of Pseudo-Dionysius, Sextus Empiricus and the Astasahasrika Prajnaparamita.


Some ancient theologians claim that God is ineffable, or not capable of being spoken of. This claim is self-refuting. If one can say nothing about God, then one cannot say even that God is ineffable. Often this is seen as a reason to dismiss such theologians as illogical or confused. Instead, I think we should see this as a puzzle to be explored: why do smart philosophers make blatantly self-refuting claims? I argue that they do so because they are employing a different logic from the usual one, and that in this alternate logic a self-refuting claim can have legitimate uses.


First, I review three strands of ancient thought that employ blatantly self-refuting claims: the works of Pseudo-Dionysius (an early Christian mystic), Sextus Empiricus (an ancient Skeptic), and the Astasahasrika Prajnaparamita Sutra, or Asta (a Buddhist holy text). I argue that all three use a common strategy, which Michael Sells calls “apophasis” in his book Mystical Languages of Unsaying. Apophasis, or “speaking-away,” makes positive claims, but then also somehow unsays their own claims. The idea is that each claim needs further correction, but that making and then correcting claims, (and then correcting our corrections, and so on) can be more powerful than simply passing over in silence those things that we cannot say. Next, I review contemporary philosophical thought on ineffability, including such thinkers as Plantinga, Alston, Hick and Yandell. One suggestion that a few recent authors have made is that mystics who make claims of ineffability might be using an alternate “mystical” logic of some kind. This seems promising; after all, the process of making and then revising claims has some different logical features than the process of making claims which are intended to be immune from revision. Most contemporary logics are monotonic, that is, conclusions are intended to be immune from revision in light of future information, which makes sense when one is trying to focus on mathematical reasoning. Non-monotonic logics, however, allow one to revise conclusions in light of new information, a feature that is often important in legal, medical and scientific reasoning. I survey contemporary thought about non-monotonic logics, as well as some related logics such as paraconsistent logics (contradiction-tolerating logics) and dialectical logics (logics of discussion).
Based on close textual reading of Pseudo-Dionysius, the Asta, and Sextus Empiricus, I argue that all three should be interpreted as heterodox logicians, employing informal versions of what today we would call non-monotonic logic. These thinkers disagree with the logicians of their day, and often have specific doctrines about logical issues such as the law of non-contradiction, or the nature of logical atoms. Further, I argue that in a non-monotonic logic, self-refuting claims have defensible uses. I argue that a claim can sometimes refute itself and also successfully refute other claims in a non-monotonic logic. I employ three basic arguments that self-refuting claims can have legitimate uses in a non-monotonic logic. First, some cases of this are simply specific instances of some of the other strange features of non-monotonic logics, such as the non-associativity of theorem closure. Second, we can see this by looking carefully at the differences between building an account and attacking an opposing account in informal reasoning. Third, we can see this by looking at the pragmatic and pedagogic value of some self-refuting scientific theories that are used today, such as the ideal gas law or the Bohr model of the atom. Sextus has a nice metaphor to explain the value of self-refuting claims. A self-refuting claim is like an emetic drug: it leads one to vomit it back up, but also leads one to vomit forth any other poisons in the stomach. Self-refuting claims such as claims of ineffability unsay themselves, but can help unsay other claims as well.